

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL D. SIMMONS, CDCR #E-96088

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Plaintiff,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No. 08-1308 IEG (BLM)

ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) AND § 1915A(b)(1).

I. Procedural History

On July 17, 2008, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, located in Calipatria, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the \$350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 4]. This Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint as frivolous. (*See* Sept. 9, 2008 Order at 5-6.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. (*Id.*) Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on October 1, 2008.

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

As the Court informed Plaintiff in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; *Calhoun v. Stahl*, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to sua sponte dismiss an *in forma pauperis* complaint that fails to state a claim); *Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). *See Calhoun*, 254 F.3d at 845; *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1127; *see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur "before service of process is made on the opposing parties"); *Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 447; *Barren*, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"); *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at

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1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear, once again, that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, like his original Complaint, contains no comprehensible allegations. Instead, Plaintiff seeks to sue "Little RICO" under the "California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act." (See FAC at 2.) Plaintiff attaches a number of exhibits but there are no factual allegations that correspond with any of these documents. In reviewing the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds that there are no factual allegations giving rise to any constitutional violation. A complaint is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to be frivolous under 1915(e)(2)(B) because it lacks even "an arguable basis either in law or in fact," and appear "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328.

Conclusion and Order III.

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is **DISMISSED** as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Moreover, because the Court finds amendment of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Since plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.") (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: ____/2/17/08____

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge United States District Court